Value Library
The following is an
excerpt from the ABC Perspective - April 2001 - Pg. 1
Nonsensical Noise
"On Wall Street today, news of lower interest rates
sent the
stock market up, but then the expectation that these rates
would be inflationary sent the stock market down, until the
realization that lower rates might stimulate the sluggish
economy pushed the market up, before it ultimately went
down on fears that an overheated economy would lead to
a reimposition of higher interest rates."
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- Mankoff 1981, The New Yorker Magazine Inc. |
Up until the recent precipitous stock
market decline, greedy, neophyte investors felt assured that the stock
market was the "proverbial horn of plenty." Common shares, in
their view, were a win-win situation since periodic stock market
declines had always come roaring back.
As a professional money manager,
however, I did not share this view. Like many observers I had become
increasingly alarmed at the astronomical market valuations that
investors had placed on mere mortal corporations such as Nortel, Amazon,
eToys et al. Furthermore, I had become increasingly concerned about the
growing nonsensical noise which inexperienced investment commentators
had nurtured amongst the gullible public. But little did we know that
this placid and prosperous period would ultimately lead to an eventual
stock market meltdown.
Now this is not to say that we had
called the high-tech/bio-tech bull market 100% correctly. We did not. We
underestimated the extent and credibility of the nonsensical noise and
the 1999 to early 2000 stock market euphoria. This "bull run"
had carried stock prices to unbelievable heights. But given our
fundamental value disciplines, even if we had been smart enough to own
an assortment of high-tech/ bio-tech stocks, we would have sold out very
early in the game due to stretched valuations. In retrospect, I had
completely underestimated the power of the nonsensical noise as stocks
continued their upward surge. A perfect example was Nortel, which peaked
out at 125 times P/E ratio and over 11 times book value; in hindsight
Nortel was grossly overvalued.
Clearly for a period of over 12
months the nonsensical noise provided excellent opportunities to take
profits and to place the proceeds elsewhere. However it appeared to many
investors that this nonsensical noise would continue forever. But much
like the Aesop's fable of "The Emperor's New Clothes", when
investors eventually stopped to think about the suddenly unexpected
profit and revenue warnings and then reviewed earnings per share, P/E's,
book value and cash flow, they become concerned. When they decided to
sell they discovered there was simply no price support. The rest is
history.
What is to be learned from this
experience? I believe that nonsensical noise, as irrational as it may
be, can become a powerful and yet dangerous stock market driver. During
this period anyone can make money in a delirious stock market
environment. But eventually the music must stop as greed shifts to
reality. In the end it is the rational, inquiring and persevering
investor who discovers the ruse of the nonsensical noise and survives to
partake in the next market cycle.
Irwin A. Michael, CFA
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